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COURTS 
Motor Vehicle: Proof of Insurance: Municipal Courts: 
CODE SECTIONS: 
BILL NUMBER: 
ACT NUMBER: 
SUMMARY: 
History 
Jurisdiction 
O.C.G.A. §§ 33-34-12 (amended), 33-34-13 
(repealed) and 36-32-7 (new) 
HB 240 
589 
The Act amends the Georgia Motor Vehi-
cle Accident Reparations Act by deleting 
the prior language of O.C.G.A. § 33-34-12. 
In order to meet a successful constitutional 
challenge to prior law, O.C.G.A. § 36-32-7 
confers jurisdiction on the recorder's, 
mayor's or police courts of a municipality 
for cases involving operations of a motor 
vehicle without a license. 
The Attorney General issued an unofficial opinion in 1980 to the Re-
corder's Court of Camilla that it did not have jurisdiction to try cases 
alleging a violation of the Code section which requires a person to carry 
liability insurance on his automobile. 1 O.C.G.A. § 33-34-12 provides that a 
person "who knowingly operates or knowingly authorizes another to oper-
ate a motor vehicle without effective insurance" or approved self-insur-
ance is guilty of a misdemeanor. Prior to revision O.C.G.A. § 33-34-12(b) 
provided that any person charged with violation of O.C.G.A. § 33-34-12(a) 
could be "tried in any recorder's, mayor's, or police court of any munici-
pality if the offense occurred within the corporate limits of that 
municipality." 
Although the recorder's court seemed to have authority to handle these 
cases, the Attorney General based his conclusion that the court lacked 
jurisdiction on the Georgia Supreme Court's decision in State v. 
Millwood.2 The challenged statute provided: "Notwithstanding any other 
provision of law to the contrary, any person who is charged with the pos-
session of one ounce or less of marijuana may be tried in any recorder's, 
mayor's or police courts of any municipality if the offense occurred within 
1. 1980 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U80-4. 
2. Id. See also 242 Ga. 244, 248 S.E.2d 643 (1978). 
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the corporate limits of such municipality."3 The court found this statute 
unconstitutional because it attempted to give the municipal courts juris-
diction to try offenses against the State. The Georgia Supreme Court ex-
plained, "[t]his the General Assembly cannot do. 'That the only courts 
with authority or jurisdiction under our Constituion to try . . . persons 
charged with the violation of State laws, are State courts . . . .'''" Since 
the language designating jurisdiction to recorder's, mayor's or police 
courts is virtually identical to the challenged statute in Millwood, the At-
torney General held that the former Code section would also be 
unconstitutional. 
The Court of Appeals of Georgia agreed with the Attorney General in 
Parker v. State,r. which held O.C.G.A. § 33-34-12 unconstitutional. HB 
240 was introduced to amend that part of the statute held unconstitu-
tional in the Parker decision. 
HB 240 
O.C.G.A. § 33-34-12 now states only that a person "who knowingly op-
erates or knowingly authorizes another to operate a motor vehicle without 
effective insurance ... or without an approved plan of self-insurance ... 
is guilty of a misdemeanor." O.C.G.A. § 33-34-13, which allowed 
municpalities to adopt the provisions of O.C.G.A. § 33-34-12 by reference 
in an ordinance, is repealed. 
O.C.G.A. § 36-32-7 was enacted in its place to specifically grant re-
corder's, mayor's or police courts of each municipality jurisdiction over 
cases arising under O.C.G.A. § 33-34-12. The language of this section is 
virtually identical to that of O.C.G.A. § 36-32-6 which was passed in re-
sponse to the Millwood decision. 
O.C.G.A. §§ 36-32-7 (c) and (d) are identical to the provisions of the 
superseded O.C.G.A. §§ 33-34-12 (c) and (d). The defendant may request 
a transfer of his case to a court having general misdemeanor jurisdiction. 
The municipality does not have any right to impose a penalty in excess of 
the limits set forth in the municipal charter. 
3. State v. Millwood, 242 Ga. 244, 245, 248 S.E.2d 643, 644 (1978). 
4. I d. at 246, 248 S.E.2d at 644. 
5. 170 Ga. App. 333, 317 S.E.2d 209 (1984). 
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